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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LOGAN, 
OF LOGAN, UTAH, a National 
Banking Association, 
Plaintiff-Appellant No. 
vs. 10621 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant-Appellee 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff to obtain a decla-
ratory judgment that the . establishment of two separate 
offices by the defendant for the receipt of deposits and 
the paying of checks is not authorized by the Utah Branch 
Banking Statute. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court and the Court entered 
a judgment for the defendant dismissing plaintiffs com-
plaint and holding that the two separate offices were not 
branches as that term is defined in Utah law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment 
in plaintiff's favor as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff and appellant is a National Banking 
Association having its main office in Logan City, Utah, 
located at 99 North Main Street. The defendant is a state 
hank having its main office in Salt Lake City and a branch 
bank in Logan, Utah, located at 102 North Main Street, 
which is directly across the street from the plaintiff, The 
First National Bank. The First National Bank being lo-
cated at the Southwest corner and the defendant, Walker 
Bank's branch, being located at the Northeast corner of 
the intersection at First North and Main Streets. The First 
National Bank is the only unit bank in Logan. Walker 
Bank acquired the Cache Valley Banking Company lo-
cated at 102 North Main in 1956 by a statutory merger 
and since that time has conducted a branch banking bus-
iness at the banking house of the Cache Valley Banking 
Company. Logan City is a city of the second class. (Tr. 
7). 
At the time of this action the banking house of 
\Valker Bank's branch was located in the west ninety feet 
of the building on the Northeast comer of First North 
and Main Street and Utah Mortgage & Loan Company 
occupied the east thirty feet. To the east of Utah Mort-
gage & Loan Company there is a twelve foot right of way 
for the use of others, and beginning about six feet east 
of this right of way, Walker Bank has erected two small 
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buildings. Each building is a separte structure and not 
physically attached to the banking house of Walker's 
branch except for a pneumatic tube which runs under-
neath the ground. Each building has a separate entrance 
through which the occupants of the building can enter 
the public street without going into the banking house 
of the Walker Bank's branch. The two separate build-
iPgs will be used for receiving deposits and paying checks 
for customers of Walker Bank. (Tr. 8). 
Neither the Utah State Bank Commissioner nor the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System have 
granted any authority to Walker Bank to operate the 
proposed facilities for receiving deposits and paying 
checks. 
The Court found that Utah Mortgage & Loan will 
vacate the premises at or about the time the additional 
facilities are opened for business, but there is no prohi-
bition against the leasing of these offices to others after 
the facilities are opened for business. 
The street address of the new facilities is 35 East 1st 
North Street. 
ARGUMENT 
OTHER THAN THE AUTHORIZATION FOR BRANCH 
BANKS, THE UTAH LEGISLATURE HAS NOT EX-
PRESSLY AUTHORIZED THE ESTABLISHMENT BY 
BANKS OF SEPARATE FACILITIES FOR RECEIVING 
OF DEPOSITS AND THE PAYING OF CHECKS 
a. The Utah Statute on Branch Banking is Restrictive. 
The tbeory under which Walker Bank constructed 
-3-
its additional offices at 35 East 1st North for receiving 
deposits and cashing checks is that they represent a mere 
extension or enlargement of the now existing branch bank-
ing house and do not constitute the establishment of an 
[ldditional branch. This is so because the offices will not 
constitute a separate and independent office operating 
in the same way as branch banks generally operate. In 
other words if the bank's records and management are 
kept at the main banking house, additional stations for 
receiving deposits and paying checks do not constitute 
branches under the definition contained in our Utah 
statute. 
Regardless of the distinctions the defendant Walker 
Bank attempts to make with regard to its denial that its 
drive-in windows at 35 East 1st North is an additional 
office for the receiving of deposits and the paying of 
checks and therefore a branch under our statute, Walker 
Bank does not deny that two separate buildings exist 
which were not there when Walker Bank acquired the 
Cache Valley Banking House in 1956. And Walker Bank 
admits that these additional offices will be used for the 
receiving of deposits and the paying of checks. 
There is no question as to the definition of a branch 
bank in Utah law. 
"The term 'branch' as used in this act shall be held 
to include any branch bank, branch office, branch 
agency, ADDITIONAL OFFICE, or any branch 
place of business AT WHICH DEPOSITS ARE RE-
CEIVED OR CHECKS PAID or money lent." (Sec-
tion 7-3-6, Utah Code Ann. 1953, emphasis mine.) 
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The Utah Statute also provides: (Section 7-3-6, Utah 
Code Ann. 1953) : 
"The business of every bank shall be conducted only 
at its banking house and every bank shall receive 
deposits and pay checks only at its banking house 
except as hereinafter provided." 
"From and after the effective date of this act no unit 
bank and no branch shall be established or authorized 
to conduct a banking business except as hereinbefore 
in Section 7-3-6 expressly provided." (Section 7-3-6.3, 
Utah Code Ann. 1953.) 
It is also undisputed that the only method by which 
a state bank can branch in Logan is by taking over a unit 
bank since there is a unit bank located in Logan and 
Logan is a city of the second class. (See Walker Bank v. 
Taylor, 15 U. 2d 234, 390 P. 2d 592.) 
In Walker Bank v. Taylor, supra., the Court said: 
"Our statute is restrictive and, what it does not ex-
pressly permit, it prohibits." 
In this case the State Bank of Provo established a 
walk-in branch in Provo and Walker brought an action 
for declaratory judgment seeking to have such establish-
ment declared illegal and void. The State Bank of Provo 
did not take over a unit bank in establishing its walk-in 
branch. The court cited Section 7-3-6, Utah Code Ann. 
l 953 and stated that: 
"The business of every bank shall be conducted only 
at its banking house and every bank shall receive 
deposits and pay checks only at its banking house 
except as hereinafter provided . . 
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"We are of the opinion that our statute is restrictive 
and, what it does not expressly permit, it prohibits. 
There is but one method of establishing a branch 
bank in a city of less than the first class having an 
existing unit bank and that is by 'taking over' such 
bank. . 
"First of all, it must be conceded that the statute 
under consideration is not ambiguous. Its literal 
wording would preclude the Commissioner from 
granting State Bank of Provo authority to establish 
the branch .. 
"We are not impressed by defendants' argument that 
the branch banking statute must be interpreted in 
light of its prior administrative interpretation and 
application. Assuming the fact that the Bank Com-
missioner has in the past granted similar applications, 
such actions are not persuasive in this case to induce 
us to vary the very unambiguous terms of our branch 
banking statutes." 
The State Bank of Provo was denied the right to have its 
walk-in branch where it did not comply with the take 
over provision of the Utah Statute. 
Is the situation here any different than that presented 
in Walker Bank v. Taylor supra. It is still true that "no 
branch (is) authorized to conduct a banking business 
except as in section 7-3-6 expressly provided." It is still 
true that "the business of every bank shall be conducted 
only at its banking house and every bank shall receive 
deposits and pay checks only at its banking house except 
as (in section 7-3-6) provided." And it is still true that 
there is no express permission for banks or branches to 
construct an additional and separate office or offices hav-
-6-
ing a different set of walls where deposits are received 
and checks paid in cities of the second class in Section 
7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. In view of the express 
language of the legislature, can it be claimed that the 
intent of the statute was to permit the construction of 
...-,dditional offices for the convenience of customers in 
making deposits and paying checks so long as the actual 
records of the deposits and payments are kept at the 
main banking house and so long as the management of 
the additional office is one and the same as that in the 
main banking house. 
Similar arguments were used in Continental Bank v. 
Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 370, 384 P2d 796. This was an action 
for declaratory judgment that the practice of the bank 
to permit insurance agents to have bank's forms for chattel 
mortgages and promissory notes and when the agent 
would contact a customer purchasing an automobile for 
insurance "either at their offices or homes or at the office 
or place of business of the customer" they would also 
arrange for the customer to borrow the money from the 
bank. The agent would call the bank for approval of 
the loan and if approved, the customer would sign a 
check drawn on the bank to purchase the automobile and 
the agent would forward the signed mortgage and note 
to the bank. The court cited Section 7-3-6 and said: 
"We consider the language of Section 7-3-6, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, referring to and 
defining the term 'branch' as meaning and including 
an office or place of business 'where deposits are 
received or checks paid or money lent' by the bank ... 
The court further stated that wherever the agent is 
"even upon the street" when he transacts the bank's bus-
-7-
iness this comes within the branch definition in the statute 
and such business is unlawful. 
"We think the requirements of the statutes are wise 
and proper that those places at which a bank receives 
deposits or cashes checks or lends money should be 
only those places which have been established pm-
suant to the statutory requirements. 
"If such office or place of business is not so established 
or conducted, then it is not proper and it is not law-
ful." 
The court rejected the argument that the entire loan 
was processed in the banking house except for the signing 
of the papers and therefore the business was conducted 
in the banking house. Here the defendant Walker 
Bank contends that the entire transaction of receiv-
ing the deposit or paying the check takes place within 
the four walls of the branch banking house except for the 
actual transfer of the money between the bank's agent 
and the customer. Except for the fact that the additional 
offices established by Walker Bank at 35 East 1st North 
are permanent structures, there seems to be no difference 
between the contention made by the bank in the Continen-
tal Bank case and that contended by Walker Bank here. 
That the legislature intended to include drive-in 
windows, teller windows and separate receiving stations 
in its definition of a branch bank seems clear if we con-
sider the language at the end of Section 7-3-6: 
"The bank commissioner may by order permitting 
the establishment of such branch or office designate 
and limit the character of work and service which 
may therein be performed." 
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Since the legislature specifically included offices 
which are limited in the services they can offer (e.g. 
merely receiving deposits or paying checks), there is no 
room for the argument that the legislature in prescribing 
the methods for establishing branches was referring only 
to full service branches and did not mean to include teller 
windows which are under the same management and 
controls as the main branch banking house. 
Walker Bank's teller windows are 134 feet from the 
entrance to the main branch banking house at 102 North 
Main. The additional offices at 35 East 1st North are 
Blso separated from the main banking house by a right 
of way and consequently there can never be a single 
building housing both offices until the owners of the 
dominant estate relinquish their right of way. Conse-
quently there is not now and never can be a single bank-
ing house receiving deposits and paying checks at both 
the 102 North Main and the 35 East 1st North locations. 
If we say that it is proper to establish a drive-in 
window 134 feet from the main entrance of the banking 
house and separated therefrom by a right of way, then 
is it proper to establish a drive-in office 134 feet from the 
main entrance and separated from the main building by 
a separate business establishment and a right of way? 
And if this is still within the intent of the legislature, can 
there be as many as ten business establishment between 
the main office and the drive-in window? 
In Jackson v. First National Bank of Valdosta, 246 F. 
Supp. 134 ( U. S. D. C. Georgia) this situation was pre-
SPnted. Here a National Bank sought to establish a 
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drive-in facility. Since the definition of the Federal Sta-
tute [see 12 U. S. C. Section 36(£)] is identical with the 
Utah statute the difference in the types of banks is of 
no consequence. In this case there were ten buildings 
between the alley and the drive-in facility instead of one 
as in the fact situation here and consequently the drive-in 
facility was 291 feet away instead of 134 feet as in our 
case. 
The court held that this was an additional office or 
branch prohibited to State banks by state law and since 
Federal banks are subject to the same restriction as state 
banks the facility was not authorized. The court quoted 
the definition of a branch in 12 U. S. C. Sec. 36 ( f) and 
said: 
"It seems to this court that either of the terms 'addi-
tional office' or 'branch place of business' is suffic-
iently broad to cover the facility in question. After 
stating the above terms the subsection ends with this 
language: 'at which deposits are received or checks 
paid or money lent.' The patent meaning of this part 
of the statute is that an 'additional office' or 'branch 
place of business' will be considered a 'branch' for 
purposes of Section 36 if any one of the three speci-
fied conditions are met, i. e. if deposits are received 
or checks are paid or money is lent. While only one 
of these conditions is necessary for coverage, two of 
them are conclusively shown to be present in the 
instant case. It is stipulated at page two of the pre-
trial order that customarily checks are cashed and 
deposits are received at the 'drive-in facility.' With 
the definition in Section 36 ( f) as broad as it ob-
viously is and with the factual requisites for its ap-
plication so conclusively established, this court woul?, 
be acting legislatively if it were to find non-coverage. 
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The court said that it was urged that this is a "mere 
expansion of an existing facility because there is a unity 
of operation with the main facility" and rejected this 
argument. 
The court said that it considered the following fac-
tors in reaching its decision: 
( 1) Distance. Here the distance was 291 feet. In 
our case there is 134 feet from the main entrance at 102 
North Main to the drive-in offices. In the case of Michi-
gan National Bank v. James J. Saxon, Civil No. 821-62, 
U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia ( 1962), 
not reported (perhaps because no competitor bank was 
involved) the court said even at a distance of 500 feet 
it is not an additional office if it is merely additional office 
space to an existing facility and not a separate and inde-
pendent office, operating in the same way as branch banks 
generally operate. If a distance of 500 feet is not object-
ionable then perhaps 1000 feet is all right or even one 
mile. Apparently over 400 feet is all right in Utah if we 
permit administrative officers to write legislation instead 
of following the language of the statute. {Tr. 16). 
( 2) Intervening structures. The court said ten 
buildings are too many. The First District Court said 
available office space for one office is apparently all right. 
But the question is posed, where is the legislation that 
prohibits an office ten buildings away but authorizes an 
office for receiving deposits and paying checks which is 
only one building away. 
( 3) Lack of physical connection. The Federal Court 
said that the lack of a pneumatic tube made no difference 
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in its decision as apparently it did not consider a tube ::t 
physical connection. The court cited differing opinions 
of attorneys general in Nebraska and South Dakota to 
show the results that can be reached where the legislature 
is permitted to remain silent on the subject by overly 
ambitious administrative officers who try to solve ever~1 
legislative problem that arises without referring the mat-
ter back to the law making body who is supposed to he 
the only consitutional authority having legislative power. 
( 4) The economic effect on the balance of compe-
tition. As is hereafter discussed an interpretation of the 
statute which gives one bank the right to provide drive-in 
service, but leaves other bank in doubt as to what pos-
sible alternatives are permissible constitutes an indirect 
method of enacting special legislation forbidden by the 
Utah Constitution. Here the decision of the District 
Court permits Walker Bank's branch to have a drive-in 
window, but the First National- Bank's property being 
surrounded by Woolworth's building, it cannot build a 
drive-in office under identical circumstances. If it pur-
chases property elsewhere for the construction of a drive-
in window, another or the same court may decide that 
the additional distance is not according to the intent of 
the legislature and will hold that the First National Bank's 
drive-in window is a branch even though operated under 
the same conditions as the drive-in window allowed 
''7alker Bank bv the decision of the lower court . 
.I 
If it is proper to establish a drive-in teller's window 
separated from the main banking house by a right of way, 
can such a teller's window be established across the street, 
which is only a public right of way? If this is proper then 
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how far down the street must the drive-in window be 
established before it comes within the definition of the 
legislature as being a branch. If Walker Bank can estab-
lish an additional office over 134 feet from the entrance 
of its main banking house and separated from the office 
by a right of way, then may Walker Bank purchase the 
Woolworth Building surrounding the First National Bank 
t1nd establish another office next door to the First Na-
tional Bank? Such an office would only be separated 
from the main banking house by a right of way and it 
would be within 134 feet of the main entrance to the 
Walker Bank branch banking house. 
A careful consideration of the above possibilities 
seems to clearly indicate that the problem is one for the 
legislature to define and not for the courts. If the Utah 
legislature wishes to permit drive-in windows as additions 
to established bank or branches it should specify the con-
ditions under which such drive-in windows can be estab-
lished as has been done by twenty other state legislatures 
faced with a similar problem as we have in Utah (see 
below). The Utah Supreme Court having stated that 
"our statute is restrictive and what it does not expressly 
permit, it prohibits" should return the problem to the 
legislature for its consideration by holding that there is 
no express authority for establishing a drive-in window 
to receive deposits and pay checks which is separated 
from the main banking house by a right of way. 
b. History and Definition Require a Separate Teller's 
window to be included in the Term "Branch." 
It is submitted that Walker Bank is trying to ac-
complish the same purpose as the Comptroller of the Cur-
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rency of the United States tried in 1922. In 1922 there 
was no Federal statute permitting branching by National 
banks. In that year the Comptroller ruled that National 
banks could open additional teller windows to carry on 
the business of banking. The First National Bank of St. 
Louis opened a teller window near its main office and 
the Attorney General of Missouri brought a quo warranto 
proceeding to determine if the structure violated Missouri 
law prohibiting branch banking. The bank contended 
that its charter authorized the doing of business in St. 
Louis and did not limit it to a particular location. The 
Supreme Court of Missouri rejected this argument and 
said the use of the singular terms office and banking house 
(cf. First paragraph of 7-3-6, UC.A. 1953) only gave the 
directors the right to choose the location and after having 
chosen that location they had no authority to subdivide 
and multiply the places of business. The court said: 
"This location having been established, it is within 
the contemplation of the statute that the power of 
the bank is to be there exercised. Otherwise the 
words 'an office or banking house' ceased to be 
specific, and instead of being singular in number may 
be construed as plural, and this permit the establish-
ment of bank in as many places within the county, 
city or town as the judgment of the directors may 
prompt." 
The court denied the National bank the right to have 
windows at separate locations. See State ex rel Barret v. 
First National Bank, 297 Mo. 397, 249 S.W. 619, 30 A.L.R. 
918. The decision was affirmed by the United States 
Supreme Court ( 1924) 263 U.S. 640, 68 L.ed. 486, 44 S. 
Ct. 213. 
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The Comptroller and the National banks interpreted 
the decision as preventing them from establishing any 
additional facilities within the community where the 
national bank was located and Congress was asked to give 
national banks some relief. While the bill was pending 
in Congress the Supreme Court of Kentucky seemed to 
disagree with the Missouri case. In Marvin v. Kentucky 
Title Trust Co. 218 Ky 135, 291 S.W. 17, 50 A.L.R. 1337, 
the court held that even though it had previously held 
that legislative silence on the subject must be construed 
[JS denying the privilege or the right to have branch banks, 
an additional office in the same city where the main bank 
was located for the purpose of receiving deposits and 
paying checks was not a branch in absence of a statutory 
definition of a branch. The Court said: 
"If a bank occupies an entire city block, can it be 
doubted it can establish an office for the receipt of 
deposits and payment of checks at each corner of its 
building and keep separate books at each place? 
Clearly the installation of such offices in the building 
is incidental to that business, and such an arrange-
ment would have no injurious effect upon the finan-
cial management and control of the bank's business, 
as the officials charged with those duties do not de-
vote their time to the details of the receipt of deposit 
or payment of checks. If such additional offices can 
be established at different points in the main build-
ing under the bank's control, no good reason appears 
why they may not be established elsewhere in the 
city of its location for the same purpose. The con-
venience to the general public of such an arrange-
ment is easily perceived. The time consumed by a 
great number of depositors in making daily trips to 
and from banks of deposit during business hours 
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calls for some measure of economy and renders the 
arrangement suggested very desirable, and as it is 
clearly incidental to the bank's business and neither 
violates the statute nor publice policy and the judg-
ment of the court limits its application to the matter 
of receiving deposits and paying checks, no good 
reason can be perceived for denying the application." 
The Court also said that a bank could have as many 
agents as it required to forward to the bank at its place 
of business the money of persons who desire to deposit 
with it. This ruling was later adopted by a Texas Court 
(Great Plains Life Ins. Co. v. First National Bank, 316 
S.W. 2d 98) and where there was a statutory definition 
of a branch the court found the reasoning of the Kentucky 
court persuasive and permitted three tellers' windows 
across the street even though branches were forbidden 
and even though a bank could only cash checks and re-
ceive deposits at its own banking house. 
In holding that a Utah bank could not permit its 
agents to make loans outside of the main banking house 
under our branch banking statute, it appears that the Utah 
Supreme Court has definitely rejected the reasoning of 
the Kentucky and Texas courts. (Continental Bank v. 
Taylor, supra.) 
With the decision of the Kentucky court in mind and 
with the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in the 
Missouri case before it, Congress broadened the definition 
CJf "branch" bank to include "additional office at which 
deposits are received, checks paid or money lent" in writ-
ing 12 U.S.C. Sec. 36(f). The indentical definition is 
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contained in our Utah statute as appears in the Federal 
Jaw. The American Bankers Association opinion is that 
under the Federal statute (which also applies to Federal 
Heserve ha11ks who are state banks under 12 U. S. C. Sec. 
:321) a teller's window constitutes a branch. (See I 
Paton's Digest page .562.) 
Apart from the cases dealing with banks it appears 
that an office "is a building, room or department in which 
tlte clerical work of an establishment is done" (Houston 
, .. Kirchwing, 117 Co. 92, 184 P 2d 487, 491) which de-
finition was taken from Webster's New International 
Dictionary, second edition. While tellers receiving de-
posits and paying checks may object to being called 
clerks, their work is clerical as distinguished from the 
management of the bank. Therefore, the fact that the 
defendant Walker Bank has two structures at 35 East 
1st North in Logan, each surrounded by four walls which 
are separate from the four walls surrounding the main 
banking house, clearly indicates under the above defini-
tion that the defendant has an additional office at which 
deposits are received or checks paid, which office is a 
branch under the statutory definition. 
If we inquire were deposits received or checks paid 
Ht 35 East 1st North when Walker Bank acquired the 
Cache Valley Banking House as a branch in 1956, we 
must answer in the negative. It seems reasonable then to 
hold that this is an additional office for receiving deposits 
and paying checks. If so, it must be conceded that it 
was not acquired by taking over another unit bank as 
expressly provided by the Utah statute. 
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c. Other States have Enacted Legislation Defining 
the Circumstances under which Drive-In Windows 
are permitted. 
At least ten states (Alaska, Arizona, California, Dela-
ware, Idaho, Maryland, Nevada, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, and Vermont) permit unlimited branch banking 
and therefore there is no problem as to whether a drive-in 
window consitutes a branch as the respective bank com-
missioners would be obliged to authorize its operation 
even if it were a branch. 
In the lower court Walker Bank relied to a great ex-
tent on the fact that in the past many attorneys general 
have ruled that drive-in windows under certain circum-
stances are not branches. This of course is to be expected 
where the definition of a branch bank varies from state 
to state. However, the question this appeal presents is 
whether an administrative official should legislate the 
circumstances under which a teller's window is a branch 
or is not a branch or whether the Court should require 
the legislahue to take action redefining the term. It is 
interesting to note that in many states the legislatures were 
not willing to permit the attorneys general to usurp their 
functions and they acted even after the attorney general 
had broadened the restrictions on teller's windows. In 
other states the action by the attorney general has been 
accepted by the state legislatures until such time as an 
unsuspecting bank's action in establishing a facility is 
challenged by a competitor in the Courts. It seems the 
Courts would be doing the banking community a dis-
service if they now permit the administrative interpreta-
tion to broaden the statutory definition and then later 
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disapprove such an interpretation when an overly ambi-
tious administrator extends the meaning of the statute 
bevond what the Court considers as reasonable. A re-
vi<:W of some of the action and opinions is presented for 
the Court's consideration: 
I. ALABAMA: 
a. Legislation ( 1958 Code, Title 5, Section 125) pro-
hibits establishment of branch banks, but many 
special laws have been enacted which permit 
branches in certain counties and municipalities. 
b. Attorney General: On Nov. 16, 1959, said separate 
tellers' windows on same lot as main banking house, 
connected by continuous asphalt paving, hot and 
cold water lines, wire from ADT alarm system and 
telephone lines were not branches. (I CCH, Fed-
eral Banking Law Reports, par. 3169, p. 2205). On 
Apr. 12, 1954, drive in window separated by 20 
foot alley and connected by overhead passage way 
and underground conveyor system was not a 
branch. ( 93rd Annual Report, Comptroller of Cur-
rency, 1955, TD No. 3200, p. 11.) 
II. ARKANSAS: 
a. Legislation: Sec. 814, 1937 Statutes, permitted ad-
ditional offices in same county for receiving de~ 
posits and paying checks if no other bank located 
there. After the Attorney General amended this 
statute by his opinion referenced below, the legis-
lature enacted Section 67-340 ( 1957 Code Anno.) 
providing for teller's windows if they are not more 
than 1000 feet from the main office, and if such 
window is more than 300 feet from the main office, 
in shall not be located closer than 1,000 feet from 
the main office of another bank. 
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b. Attorney General: On Mar. 7, 1955, ruled that it 
would be legal to place teller's window across the 
street, 80 feet from the banking house, connected 
by a pneumatic tube. (TD No. 3200, supra). 
III. COLORADO: 
a. Legislation: Rev. Stat. Sec. 14-13-1. No branches 
permitted and a facility or paying or receiving sta-
tion is a branch. 
b. Attorney General: May 28, 1959, teller's windows 
on same lot, within 50 feet of building, connected 
by pnenmatic tubes is not a branch. (I CCH, Fed. 
Banking Law Reports, supra.) 
IV. FLORIDA: 
a. Legislation: 1927 Stat. Sec. 6070 prohibits branches. 
Cum. Supp. Section 659.06 provides that banks may 
operate a drive in facility if part of or adjacent to 
main banking room; there must be a physical con-
nection of the main banking room and the facility; 
there must be a private connecting doorway or 
enclosed passageway connecting main banking 
room and drive-in so tellers can pass between the 
two without coming in contact with the public. 
The bank may have walk up facility not physically 
connected if located on same or contiguous pro-
perty as main banking room. 
V. GEORGIA: 
a. Legislation: 1933 Code Sec. 12-203 no new 
branches. Cum. Supp, Section 13-201.l et seq. 
One facility within limits of city where main bank 
is located may be established (but not two as was 
attempted in Valdosta case, supra). Facility must 
be within two miles of main bank. 
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n. INDIANA: 
a. Legislation. After the Attorney general modified 
the branch banking statute with the opinion set 
forth below, the legislature enacted Chap. 125, Acts 
of 1959, amending Burns Anno. Sta. 18-1104 which 
provides that any bank which owns or leases a 
parking lot not more than 500 feet from the main 
office of the bank and no closer to some other 
bank than it is to the bank establishing such facil-
ity, may maintain on the parking lot an office for 
receiving deposits and paying checks. 
b. Attorney General: Feb. 16, 1953 ruled the opera-
tion of a banking facility office located across an 
alley from main banking premises, and connected 
by a tunnel was not a branch. (TD 3200 supra). 
VII. IOWA 
a. Legislation. After the attorney general modified 
the statute which was silent on walk up or drive in 
windows with the opinion set forth below, the 
legislature provided that banks may establish one 
parking lot office either adjacent to the bank or 
remote but if remote it must also be remote from 
any other bank and also remote from the parking 
lot office of any other bank. (Anno. code Sec. 
528.51 ). 
b. Attorney General. On Mar. 12, 1954 ruled that a 
station one half block plus two streets from the 
main bank and connected by a pneumatic tube was 
not a branch. (TD 3200, supra.) 
VIII. ILLINOIS: 
a. Legislation: Anno. Stat. Chap. 16~ Sec. 106 pro-
vides that no bank shall establish or maintain more 
than one banking house or receive deposits, or pay 
che1~ks at any other place than such banking house. 
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b. Attorney General. On March 8, 1962 said that a 
facility which is separated by more than an alley 
and is not adjacent to main banking house is pro-
hibited even though connected by a pneumatic 
tube. (I CCH, Fed. Banking Reports, supra.) 
IV. KANSAS: 
a. Legislation. After the attorney general modified 
the statute which was silent as to drive-in teller 
windows in the opinion set forth below, the legis-
lature provided in Cum. Supp. Sec. 9-1111 that 
banks may establish an auxiliary teller office within 
2600 feet of main bank but not closer than 50 feet 
to another bank to receive deposits and pay checks. 
b. Attorney General. On Mar. 31, 1954, mled that 
a separate teller window connected with the bank-
ing office by a tunnel, corridor or passageway not 
accessible to general pubHc was not a branch. (TD 
3200 supra.) 
X. MASSACHUSETTS: 
a. Legislation: A branch office is permitted by Chap. 
168, Sec. 5, Acts of 1957, Chap. 1, if no main office 
of another bank is located in the town. 
XI. MICHIGAN 
a. Legislation. Section 23.762 ( 1) ( 2) as amended 
by Public Acts of 1959, No. 248 a branch facility 
is permitted if no bank or branch within five miles 
thereof has been established. 
XII. MINNESOTA 
a. Legislation. Anno. Sta. 1946 Section 48.34. No 
bank may receive deposits or pay checks within 
this state except at its own banking house. 
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b. Attorney General. On April 12, 1960 said that a 
drive in 127.5 feet from main banking house and 
connected by pneumatic tube was not a branch. 
(I CCH, Fed. Banking Reports, supra.) 
XIII. MISSISSIPPI 
a. Legislation: 1956 Code Sec. 5226-5236.5 and laws 
of 1962, S.B. 1674 permit a drive-in teller's window 
within the same municipality in which the branch 
or bank is located. 
XIV. MISSOURI 
a. Legislation. After the attorney general modified 
the language of the statute prohibiting branch 
banks as set forth below the legislature enacted 
Section 362.107 which permits one drive-in and 
walk-up facility not more than 1000 yards from the 
bank nor closed than 400 feet to a competing bank 
unless it is closer to the parent bank than the com-
peting bank. 
h. Attorney General. On Mar. 30, 1949 he ruled that 
an office connected by a pneumatic tube in a park-
ing lot directly across from the bank was not a 
prohibited branch. (TD 3200 supra.) 
XV. MONTANA 
a. Legislation: S. R. 67 of the laws of 1.965 author-
izes bank to enter into agreements reducing re-
quired distances from main banking house to facil-
ity from 200 to 1.50 feet between competiting facil-
ities and from 300 feet to 200 feet between facility 
and main banking house. 
XVI. NEBRASKA 
a. Legislation. After the attorney general modified 
the legislation which prohibited banks from receiv-
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ing deposits or paying checks except at its own 
banking house as indicated below the legislature 
provided in Rev. Stat. 8-1,105 for a teller window 
within 2600 feet but not closer than 300 feet to 
another bank, nor closer than 50 feet to another 
teller window of another bank. 
b. Attorney General. On June 3, 1954 he said a teller 
window across the alley and connected by a pneu-
matic tube was not a prohibited branch. (TD 3200, 
supra.) 
XVII. NEW JERSEY 
a. Legislation. Anno. Stat. 17 :9A-19 through 23.8 
and 17: 9A-139 permit auxiliary office not more 
than 2000 feet nor closer than 1000 feet from a 
competing bank unless such bank gives its written 
permission. 
XVIII. NEW MEXICO 
a. Legislation. Anno. Stat. 1953 Sec. 48-2-16 through 
19 an additional office is permitted if connected 
by a subterranean or overhead passageway through 
which bank personnel may pass. 
XIX. NEW YORK 
Legislation. Sections 190 through 195 as added by 
Laws of 1960 Chap. 1064 and amended by Laws 
of 1961 Chap. 203 permit one public accommoda-
tion office not more than 1000 feet from main bank 
or branch. 
XX. NORTH CAROLINA 
a. Legislation. Gen. Stat. 1960 Sec. 53-141 and Cum. 
Supp. 53-62 permit teller's window in same town 
or city as bank or branch is located. 
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XXI. NORTH DAKOTA 
a. Legislation. Cnt. Code. Anno. 1959 Sec. 6-03-15 
through 19 and Cum. Supp. 6-03-14 permits receiv-
ing and paying stations in any city where another 
bank is not located. 
xxn. OKLAHOMA 
a. Legislation. After the attorney general enacted his 
own branch banking statute by the below opinion 
in 1965 the legislature enacted Sec. 415.A which 
permits drive-in or walk-up teller's windows within 
1000 feet of the main bank building. 
b. Attorney General. Between 1953 and 1955 issued 
various opinions permitting teller's windows within 
4000 feet if connected by closed circuit television. 
(TD 3200, supra. ) 
XXIll. SOUTH DAKOTA 
a. Legislation. After the attorney general modified 
the law in the opinion cited below, the legislature 
enacted H. B. 646 of the Laws of 1965 which per-
mits one detached drive-in under certain specific 
conditions. 
b. Attorney General. On August 2, 1954 ruled that a 
small building connected by a tunnel would not be 
a branch but if connected by only a pneumatic 
tube it would be a prohibited branch. (TD 3200 
supra.) 
XXIV. TEXAS 
a. Legislation. After the attorney general continued 
to modify the statute as indicated below the legis-
lature passed H. B. Laws of 1963 amending Art. 
342-903 providing an office may be maintained 
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within 500 feet if connected by a tunnel or passage-
way. 
b. Attorney General. On Apr. 26, 1950 held that a 
window across the street connected by a tunnel 
was not a branch. (TD 3200 supra.) 
XXV. WYOMING 
a. No legislation on the subject. 
b. Attorney General. On May 12, 1955 ruled that 
the banks may open offices even though no physical 
connection with the bank. (TD 3200, supra. ) 
XXVI. WISCONSIN 
a. Legislation. Laws of 1959 S. B. 95 amending Sec-
tion 221.14( 4) provides that a bank may purchase 
or lease real estate to provide parking facilities and 
establish paying and receiving windows on such 
real estate if within 300 feet of bank's main office. 
b. Attorney General. In a ~ourageous opinion that 
held the above statute means what it says, on Aug. 
ust 29, 1962, he ruled that if primary purpose of 
real estate purchase was to provide parking lot a 
teller window could be erected if within 300 feet 
of main banking office. (I CCH, Fed. Banking 
Reports, supra.) 
It is respectfully submitted that since the Utah Legis-
lature has remained silent on the question of additional 
facilities for paying checks and receiving deposits, the 
court should not permit the Attorney General or any other 
administrative body to define the number of feet, the 
distance, the purposes, the physical connection, or any 
other factor that must be considered before a bank or 
branch may establish such additional office for the pay-
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ing of checks or receiving of deposits. If the Court fol-
lows its previous opinions and continues to state that 
"our statute is restrictive, and what it does not expressly 
authorize it prohibits," then all banks are on equal grounds 
and the burden is on the banking community to obtain 
:.;ction from the legislature if business requirements neces-
sitate some form of drive-in window service. As is indi-
cated above, in nearly every state having a problem as to 
when a drive-in office is a branch, the legislature has 
recognized that it must solve that problem. The Supreme 
Court can assist in bringing the problem before the Utah 
legislature by following its previous cases and reversing 
the lower court. 
Under the restrictions mentioned in the attorney 
general opinions cited, Walker Bank's tellers window 
may have been a branch in nine of the states mentioned 
at the time of the opinion and would not have been a 
branch in only five of the states. 
Walker's Facility Reason Walker's Office 
State a Branch? may be a Branch 
ALABAMA 
ARKANSAS 
COLORADO 
INDIANA 
IOWA 
Yes Attorney General required over-
head passage way when separ-
ated by an alley. 
No Walker's office would probably 
not be a branch. 
Yes Walker's office is not on same lot 
but is separated by an alley. 
Yes Walker's office is not connected 
by a tunnel. 
No Walker's office would probably 
not be a branch. 
-27-
ILLINOIS 
KANSAS 
MINNESOTA 
MISSOURI 
NEBRASKA 
OKLAHOMA 
Yes Walker's office is separated by 
more than an alley, there is also 
a separate business establishmeut 
between main office and teller 
window. 
Yes Walker's office is not separated 
by a tunnel. 
Yes Walker's office also separated by 
an alley from main office. 
No Walker's office would probably 
not be a branch. 
Yes Walker's office also separated by 
another business establishment 
from its branch. 
No Walker's office would probably 
not be a branch. 
SOUTH DAKOTA Yes Walker's office not connected by 
a tunnel. 
TEXAS 
WYOMING 
Yes Walker's office not connected by 
a tunnel. 
No Walker's office would probably 
not be a branch. 
d. Administrative Interpretations of Statutes may 
cause Unequal Competition. 
In order to emphasize the importance of permitting 
the legislature to clearly define the limitations under 
which a bank may operate a drive-in window may we 
assume a situation that has grown out of experience of a 
number of banks. 
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Suppose in 1962 the Provo State Bank recognized 
that its customers would be better served if it provided 
a drive-in window for receiving deposits and paying 
checks. In checking with the State Bank commissioner 
he may have told of an early opinion of the attorney 
general which permitted drive in windows within 146 
feet of the main banking office. In checking with the 
bank's attorneys they would be required to review much 
of the argument that has heretofore been presented in 
subdivision "a" "b" and "c" above. The uncertainty may 
have sent the bank's officers back to the State Bank Com-
missioner. 
This time the State Bank Commissioner might say 
that pehaps the better method would be to apply for a 
branch and then the formal approval of the Commissioner 
could be obtained and thus remove the uncertainty where 
an expansion is commenced without approval. The at-
torneys for the Bank review the matter and conclude that 
the Utah State Statute would authorize a branch and the 
bank proceeds accordingly. Walker Bank v. Taylor, 
supra. is the result. 
Later Walker Bank proceeds to build a drive-in win-
dow a block away from its main banking office in Provo 
us First Security Bank has done and under the decision 
of the District Court in this case is upheld. In neither 
ease was there express permission in the statute for the 
nction taken. In the first case the Utah Supreme Court 
said that Provo State Bank must suffer the consequences 
because what "our statute does not expressly authorize 
it prohibits." But it is respectfully submitted that a com-
petive advantage may be given other banks who also as-
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sumed the risk that the plain wording of the statue may 
mean something more than it says, if the Court now says 
that its statement in Walker Bank v. Taylor, supra, was 
not correct and affirms the District Court. Unless the 
Court at this time follows its previous opinions and re-
verses the lower Court, the legislature may not see any 
necessity for taking action. And in the future some 
other small unit bank, unable to pay the high price for 
purchasing an adjoining lot separated only by another 
office and a right of way, will proceed in an attempt to 
remain alive in the highly competitive banking field and 
purchase a lot at a greater distance, only to have the 
Court say that it exceeded the distance which the Court 
felt was reasonable, and the drive-in facility even though 
connected by a tube and managed by the same officers 
was in fact a branch under our statutory definition. 
It is respectfully suggested that Utah will not have 
a definite statutory requirement as to the conditions under 
which a bank may operate a teller window, unless the 
Supreme Court reverses the lower court and puts the 
burden of such definition on the legislature as they may 
be assisted by the banking community. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ted S. Perry 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
106 Church Ave. 
Logan, Utah 
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